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CITIES IN THE AIRPORTS’ SHADOW: 
UNDERLYING INTERESTS AND 
DISCRETIONARY POWER IN AIRPORT-
REGION DEVELOPMENT 
DONNET, Timothy. Queensland University of Technology, Australia. 
KEAST, Dr. Robyn. Queensland University of Technology, Australia. 
ABSTRACT 
The previously distinct boundary between airports and their cities has become increasingly 
blurred as new interests and actors are identified as important stakeholders in the decision 
making process.  As a consequence airport entities are more than ever seeking an integrated 
existence with their surrounding regions. While current planning strategies provide insights 
on how to improve and leverage land use planning in and around airports, emerging 
challenges for implementing and protecting these planning ideals stem from the governance 
shadows of development decisions.  
 
The thesis of this paper is that improving the identification, articulation and consideration of 
city and airport interests in the development approval process (between planning and 
implementation) can help avoid outcomes that hinder the ability of cities and their airports to 
meet their separate/mutual long-term objectives. By applying a network governance 
perspective to the pilot case study of Brisbane, analysis of overlapping and competing actor 
interests show how different governance arrangements facilitate (or impede) decision making 
that protects sustainable ‘airport region’ development.  
 
Contributions are made to airport and city development decision makers through the 
identification and analysis of effective and ineffective decision making pathways, and to 
governance literature by way of forwarding empirically derived frameworks for showing how 
actors protect their interests in the ‘crowded decision making domain’ of airport region 
development.  This work was carried out through the Airport Metropolis Research Project 
under the Australian Research Council’s Linkage Projects funding scheme (LP0775225). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most airports were initially situated some distance from their cities. As the boundaries of 
cities have expanded, airports are no longer distinct and separate entities, but an integral 
feature of the urban environment. This growing spatial proximity means that decisions for 
land use and development on either city or airport land are likely to have impacts that affect 
one another in either or both the short- or long-term (Stevens, Baker and Freestone 2010). 
These overlapping impacts increase the demand for joint decision making processes and 
mechanisms to ensure that airport developments do not impede the sustainable growth of its 
city, and likewise that city developments do not impede the sustainable growth of its airport 
(Gillen 2006). 
 
The separation of planning authority between Australia’s airports and cities is not seamless 
or unambiguous. With the introduction of the Airports Act 1996 and the subsequent leasing of 
the major airports to private corporations, the Commonwealth Government retained policy 
and planning rights over the properties, while passing onto the new owners operational rights 
as well as a range of development rights with no restrictions on land use (other than 
compliance with the Airports Act 1996). The Airports Act 1996 required an Airport Master 
Plan with a twenty year indicative vision, replaced every five years and informed by public 
comment and approved by Government. Under the privatisation model, local and state 
government input into on-airport development was limited to consultative processes, as part 
of the Master Plan process. Similarly, there were few mechanisms for airport operator input 
into regional development (Baker and Freestone 2008; Koppenjan et al. 2009). 
 
These essentially isolated processes for planning and approving developments within city 
and airport boundaries, were largely sufficient as long as their intersecting interests were 
complimentary of one another - be it spatially and/or strategically. Tensions arise when 
developments proposed within one domain are perceived to have foreseeable negative 
impacts on the interests held within a neighbouring domain. In the case of airport and city 
domains by example, tensions arise from developments close to flight paths and airport 
access corridors (i.e. Barcelona, Spain and Vantaa Airport, Finland), and developments that 
compete with existing urban infrastructures such as shopping centres and commercial office 
space (i.e. Sydney Airport, Australia and Zuidas and Schiphol Airport, Netherlands). 
 
The structures that frame the governance of development decision making (planning and 
approval) for airports and cities are not perfect, nor are they unitary. Rules and regulations 
help to guide planners and developers to make appropriate decisions for what to build, 
where, when and how. However some situations are either too complex or are not 
adequately catered for in existing rules and regulations to easily make decisions.  
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Defining the problem 
The disconnect of airport and regional planning can create an ambiguous decision making 
space – albeit a shrinking one – between airports and regions, stemming from the competing 
needs of urban and airport growth. On one hand airports will plan airside and landside 
development with the intention to meet their strategic goals, and likewise local cities and 
regions will plan for residential, commercial, industrial, transport and utility development to 
meet their public goals. Additionally, developers play an essential role as organisations that 
propose and implement projects that appreciate the needs of their clients within the planned 
urban environment. 
 
In response to the growing intersection and tensions between airport and city growth, 
alternative governance arrangements, both formal and informal have been introduced to 
facilitate dialogue and joint action between airports and local/regional decision makers. Cast 
in the form of networks, these integrating arrangements are largely built on interaction among 
peers and are fortified by increasing trust between members and the understanding that joint 
effort delivers mutual gains. Network governance structures differ from the hierarchical 
structure of the airport firm or government department, in that unilateral power and authority 
are not present or exercised, instead integration is achieved through self organisation, 
flexibility and inclusion (Powell 1990; Kickert et al. 1997). In these new governance 
arrangements airport operators, city representative and other stakeholders including 
developers and, at times citizens, are all assumed to have equal power.  However, while 
network models assume a high level of non-hierarchical process and control, the reality is 
that many of these new structures sit along-side hierarchical modes (Keast et al. 2006; 
McGuire 2006). Given the reliance on network governance approaches in addressing 
complex infrastructure decision making processes, including those for airports, it is important 
to know how far the institutional shadow of the hierarchy can be cast and when and how it 
influences the operation and impact of networks within its domain. 
 
In order to explore the limits and influences of institutional shadows the paper has been 
organised to first provide a baseline understanding of network governance theory, 
highlighting the importance of the institutional shadow of the hierarchy. The next section 
provides brief descriptions of the different perspectives that airports, cities and developers 
appear to adhere to in debates surrounding developments in, bordering and close to airports. 
This is followed in Section 3 by a discussion of the pilot case of Brisbane on the governance 
arrangements that are in place (or espoused) as integrative mechanisms, and the potential 
impact of institutional anchorage on their design, purpose and functioning.  Following the 
case description the research method is detailed in Section 4. Findings are presented in 
Section 5, unpacking the complexity of the decision making ‘eclipse’ presented in Figure 1. 
Section 6 elaborates on the findings’ implications for theory and practice, and Section 7 
concludes with the limitations of the pilot study and recommendations for future research. 
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2. LITERATURE 
Network governance 
Governance has become a critical consideration for airport operation, not only in terms of the 
correct ownership and operation forms for effective and efficient internal operation of airports 
(Oum, Adler and Yu 2006; Carney and Mew 2003) but also as a mechanism to better 
integrate the increasingly complex and crowded decision making and planning that needs to 
occur between airports and their local regions (Koppenjan et al. 2009; Keast et al. 2006). In 
relation to the latter, network governance describes the array of horizontally oriented modes 
of decision making that have emerged as a result of increasing need for cooperation and 
consensus between the multiplicity of actors engaged in airport operation and development. 
Advocates of network governance highlight the necessity of networked forms of decision 
making to manage uncertainty, resolve ‘wicked’ societal problems, access expertise and 
enable broader stakeholder participation in decision making (Keast 2001; Koppenjan and 
Klijn 2004). Indeed, significant claims have been made about the benefits of networked 
governance arrangements in assisting the integration of decisions for physical infrastructure 
in complex urban regions (Graham and Marvin 2001). 
 
With its emphasis on interpersonal rather than authority relations and informal structures, 
network governance replaces hierarchical control and institutional fiat with a continuing 
process of negotiation and dialogue among interested parties (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; 
Keast et al. 2006; Sorenson and Torfing 2007). The network governance perspective is 
underpinned by an awareness of a level interdependency between actors. That is, there is an 
understanding that issues can not be resolved by working alone, in silos. The interactive 
nature of networks, coupled with the alignment of members to interest positions and the need 
to establish a point of commonality for joint action leads to complex decision making 
processes. Nonetheless, the flexibility and inclusiveness of networks are argued to produce 
better outcomes in complex project environments (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 2000; 
Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
Networks under the Shadow of the Hierarchy  
In some respects networked forms may be self regulating; they are still embedded in or sit 
along-side hierarchical structures and may be affected by the controls and signals that 
deliberately or accidentally flow over and shape the nature of the interactions. Thus 
assuming network properties and processes, many of the emergent alternative networked 
governance forms nonetheless, operate within the ‘shadow of the hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1994). 
The shadow that the firm (airport) or government department casts over other bodies within 
its domain is argued to be sufficient to influence the processes and outcomes of a 
horizontal/network mode. 
 
Scharpf (1997, 197) however points out that there is a “difference between a hierarchical 
structure and the actual use of hierarchical direction in order to override the decision 
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preferences of other actors”. That is, although there is no doubt that decision makers within 
hierarchically based firms or departments can influence or even over-rule the functioning of 
networks, they don’t always seek to use this power over others (Scharpf 1994, 38). In its 
stead they can draw up on dialogue and other processes aimed at developing joint actor 
agreement. Thus, for Scharpf the institutional setting and the hierarchical structure are not 
fixed and there are different approaches depending on the context. He notes that interactions 
with the character of unilateral action ‘mutual action’ and negotiation (joint decision) are 
possible even though they make take place in or alongside a hierarchical setting. 
Hierarchical direction may be rarely used but an awareness of its presence is important for 
the way in which the actors within a hierarchical structure behave (1994, 40). In this way, the 
shadow of the hierarchy can either strengthen or constrain new cross agency integration 
arrangements and it seems that much depends on how deep or far the shadow is cast. 
Multiple actors in airport-region development 
Airport decision makers 
While airports are increasingly divested from state ownership and control (Carney and Mew 
2003, 2006), it is arguable that they still provide the same basic service as providers of 
access to aviation transport. So while (privatised) airports are increasingly responsible for 
their own revenue streams (often hedged through non-aviation development) the heavy 
regulation of airports leads us to consider privatised and state airports as similar in the public 
values they must consider. For the purpose of the presented study we define airport decision 
makers as the set of government representatives and agencies, private organisations and 
authorities that have legitimate influence over decisions to approve expanding, developing 
and maintaining airport infrastructures and capacities.  These include airport controlling 
organisations such as airport authorities and private consortiums, and development approval 
bodies such as government ministers and oversight commissions. 
The airport-region 
The term ‘airport-region’ is used in this study to identify an area that includes an airport and 
the surrounding land that holds residents, businesses and infrastructures that influence and 
are influenced by airport operations and users. This includes areas that are effected by 
aircraft noise, areas with increased traffic density from airport users (transport corridors), and 
areas that attract businesses for the benefits of locating near airports. This loose definition 
fits closely to elements of Kasarda’s (2001) aerotropolis model, Blanton’s (2004) air front, 
and transport issues highlighted by Finavia’s (2004) aviopolis, and tightens the focus from 
broad reaching economic benefits to more localised, substantive impacts that are 
experienced close to airport boundaries. 
 
For this paper we consider the airports, cities and developers as the primary decision makers 
for developments in and around airports, illustrated in Figure 1 (below). Airports and cities 
provide plans for future directions in growth while proposals are forwarded by developers to 
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meet the demands of the region (or for opportunistic growth). Each actor has its own 
strategic interests, decision making structures and boundaries of authority, and each actor 
has a vested interest in decision outcomes for what to build, where, when and how. The 
strategic interests of each actor are not necessarily compatible with one another, and 
development within an airport-region provides a context where each actors’ set of interests 
overlap and compete for defining what is acceptable for the outcome of a development. The 
following subsections provide background information and generalised perspectives that 
Australian airports, cities and developers appear to adhere to in debates surrounding 
developments in airport-regions. 
 
Figure 1. Overlapping interests and arrangements for airport-region development. 
The airport perspective 
Australia’s major airports are built on Federal land and leased to private operators on long 
term lease agreements. These semi-privatised airports are not required to adhere to local 
planning laws as Master Plans and Major Development Plans (MDPs) are subject to Federal 
approval processes as per the Australian Airports Act 1996. The separation of planning and 
approval from local agencies allows Australia’s major airports to focus on their primary role 
as gateways to regions. In doing so they provide regions with access to aviation based 
passenger and cargo transportation services in alignment with national interests focused 
towards economic development and regional growth (NAPWP 2009, 218). 
 
Decisions for airport planning and development centre on the requirements needed to meet 
regional and airline demands for aviation capacity, embedded in forecasts and strategies. 
From an airport’s perspective, planning decisions classically focus on what an airport needs 
to do to meet future (forecasted) demand (de Neufville and Odoni 2003) with processes 
aligned towards airport and aviation needs, or airport-centric decision making (as per 
Alexander 1998, and Goetz and Szyliowicz 1997). The airport-centric focus to planning is 
reinforced in Australian airport decision making frameworks as the requirements of airports to 
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decision making 
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Developer 
interests, authority 
and decision 
making protocols 
 
 
City interests, 
authority and 
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show how they will meet their forecasted future aviation needs through airport Master Plans 
(Airports Act 1996). However the purely airport-centric focus has been tempered somewhat 
via the Federal Government’s increasing encouragement (and requirement) to show how 
their plans appreciate local community stakeholder interests. 
 
Airports are also loci of employment, and generally accepted as essential drivers for regional 
economic growth (Kasarda 2004; Charles et al. 2007). The concentration of national, 
regional and local value in airports makes their (service) sustainability a core concern across 
all tiers of government. From the airport perspective it appears prudent that planning for 
airport development be left to airports themselves. For airports to continue planning and 
developing to meet growing demand there must be sufficient capacity for the safe movement 
of aircraft in and out of airports. A number of technical aviation safety requirements, logistics 
requirements and social issues threaten the ability of airports to (enduringly) meet demands 
for growth. 
 
Developments off airports, if left under-regulated, without effective enforcement, or without 
common sense could easily limit the future capacity of airports. Developments negatively 
effecting future airport capacity can include structures that reduce the safety of flight 
operations, developments that add to the congestion of existing access corridors to and from 
an airport, and developments that may negatively impact the curfew status of an airport. 
Examples of these include tall buildings penetrating controlled airspace, shopping malls 
located on airport feeder roads, and large residential developments directly under 
approach/takeoff flight paths. Unsurprisingly, when a development appears to threaten the 
future capacity of an airport, the airport typically makes their objections known immediately.   
The city perspective 
From a city perspective, development is about maintaining transparency and accountability 
while trying to meet the strategic objectives it has set in its City Master Plan, and 
appreciating agendas passed down by higher authorities (see Adams 1994 and Forster 
2006). Local governments pursue these aims through zoning and building laws, and approval 
processes open to public comment. Smaller development applications, such as extensions to 
houses, face highly prescriptive guidelines for what can and cannot be built (such as 
Common Building Projects and Renovations guidelines). Large scale development on the 
other hand, typically attracts special interest from Councils to ensure fit to guidelines set in 
the City Master Plan and to meet the higher order objectives set by the State.  
 
Facilitating growth, environment and lifestyle are key themes embedded in regional plans 
across Australia’s State level planning agencies (see South East Queensland Regional Plan 
- QLD, Sydney-Canberra Corridor Regional Strategy - NSW, Growth Area Planning - VIC), 
which in turn provide City Councils with overarching targets and guidelines for developing 
their own Master Plans. Pressures from strong growth forecasts in Regional Plans therefore 
place considerable pressure on local planning agencies to encourage development within 
their jurisdictions, and finding ways to encourage growth while keeping disturbances to 
residents’ lifestyles to a minimum. With respect to cities with airports in reasonably close 
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proximity of their central business districts (CBDs), flight paths and the disamenity of their 
associated noise footprints bring additional planning problems. 
 
For a number of cities in Australia, approach and takeoff flight paths track over existing or 
attractive sites for high rise development. Cities want to protect development of their CBDs 
from aviation safety laws for the sake of economic development (see Munro 2009, 4), 
presenting three options for local development approval agencies; 1) cap high rise 
development to protect flight path clearances, 2) lobby to have the flight path moved away 
from CBDs, or 3) approve developments in the hope that obstacles will force flight paths to 
shift. The positioning of approach and takeoff flight paths and the laws regarding safe 
obstacle clearance are managed Federally by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, and Air 
Services Australia. However several developments penetrating controlled airspace have 
gone (seemingly) unchallenged by Federal regulators, suggesting some level of 
ineffectiveness in the enforcement of existing laws (Banks 2009). 
 
Overall, development is necessary for City Councils to meet population and economic growth 
concerns, and aviation operations add complexity to the tasks of city planning and evaluating 
development applications. Defining what is appropriate development is uncertain for 
development applications in areas that are close to airports and/or under flight paths, 
particularly when there is little enforcement - or acceptance (see Munro 2009) - of the rules 
that are designed to manage the interface of aviation operations and urban development.  
The developer perspective 
As private organisations, developers are foremost responsible to their shareholders and 
clients. Typically given the task to prepare, seek approval and implement development 
applications, developers often employ a suite of consultants to create development 
applications that meet City Council and/or State Government requirements, with the express 
interest of creating value for themselves and/or their clients. Developers are required to work 
within the limitations of zoning and building guidelines provided by both State and Local 
authorities. However limitations within formal guidelines allow for some level of interpretation 
and negotiation possible for development applications.  
 
To make a successful development application, developers are tasked with coordinating 
assets (consultants, stakeholders, etc), providing authorities with necessary paperwork 
(business case documents, designs, impact assessments, etc.), and lobbying influential 
decision makers (owners, city planners, politicians, local interest groups). When there is 
uncertainty to what, where or how a development should take shape, deliberation with the 
approving authority (often Council level) is often sought to provide certainty. 
 
Overt airport related limitations to developers are set in laws and guidelines provided by 
regulating authorities (Federal, State or Local). Less obvious limitations stem from political 
agendas and factors causing lower returns on investment, such as increased construction 
costs from noise insulation, or reduced floor space to sell from building height restrictions. 
The result is a decision making environment that relies heavily on the rule structures 
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governing what can and cannot be built, and the oversight of regulating bodies to ensure 
enforcement of building laws. However opportunities do exist for innovative development 
applications that may be negotiated towards approval via political and/or legal channels. 
Perspective overview 
The above perspectives provide generalised snapshots of how different decision makers 
approach development within areas substantively influenced by airports and their aviation 
operations. A development attracting interest from both airport and city results in positions 
being taken by each of the three major actors in airport-region development; developers 
rationalising their vision of what can be deemed appropriate development based on the 
needs of their clients and owners, and the needs of regulating authorities; cities rationalising 
their vision of what can be deemed appropriate development based on their development 
application guidelines, agendas set in City Master Plans, and political environment; and 
airports rationalising their vision of what can be deemed appropriate development based on 
the strategic needs of airport and aviation continuity. 
 
Each of the aforementioned visions have the potential to compete with one another, 
particularly when one vision of what is beneficial negatively influences the ability of another 
actor to protect their interests. Each actors’ vision of what they deem appropriate 
development is built upon a range of values. While some interests are likely to be universal 
to a type of actor (i.e. all airports have a vested interest in protecting safe aviation operating 
environments, shareholder profits and development), we envisage a number of interests as 
being contextually isolated. For example, the distance between a runway and local urban 
structures has a large influence on the urban area effected by aircraft noise, and runway 
orientation as compared to the layout of the city will influence whether or not high rise CBD 
development is influenced by airspace. 
 
Despite contextually based issues that are likely to vary from one case to the next, the 
overarching need for airports and cities to integrate decisions for development remains. Not 
only are the interests of airports, cities and developers crowded into the one space for 
airport-regions, decision making structures and protocols intersect in the same space. Actors 
are required to (or choose to) engage with one another, bringing each actors’ institutional 
shadows together. However explaining to what extent integration occurs when institutional 
interests and arrangements intersect in airport-regions is not well defined. To focus the 
investigation the following sub-questions have been added to our exploration of network 
governance in airport-region development: 
 
1. How does an airport and Local Government Council currently work towards 
integrating decisions of what to build, where, when and how? 
2. What needs to be done to better facilitate planning integration to ensure better 
development outcomes for both city and airport?  
 
The next section describes the pilot case used for answering the above questions listed, and 
in turn informing the exploration of institutional shadows of the hierarchy. As the pilot case is 
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a live development, names of the developing organisation and associated stakeholders have 
been omitted to protect their commercial interests and to protect the identity of the key 
informants who contributed to the research. The case description provided in this study has 
been left purposefully broad and context driven, as providing concise descriptions of the 
type(s) of development and substantive issues arising from the case would possibly allow the 
identification of the organisations concerned. Enough detail has been excluded to protect the 
identity of the organisations involved, however the rich context provided clearly highlights 
how the actors come together (or don’t) when making decisions on the development. 
3. PILOT CASE 
Case selection 
The Brisbane Airport-Region was selected for its sizeable projected growth numbers for 
regional economy, regional population and airport passenger demand (Guhathakurta and 
Stimson 2007; BAC 2009). A current development project located between Brisbane Airport 
and the Brisbane CBD was selected as the pilot case for this study. Screening for case 
selection focused on selecting larger, publicly visible developments that were close to airport 
and city transport/access corridors, near approach/takeoff flight paths, and espoused (by 
developers, city and/or airport) to generate substantial economic benefits within the region. 
Five projects were identified as potential cases of airport-region development, however only 
one case is presented in this study to serve as a pilot for testing the concept put forth in 
Section 2. 
Case background 
Urban development strategies currently employed for the Brisbane and South East 
Queensland Region are debated for the apparent need for increased government 
intervention for achieving integrated city-region strategies for sustainable development 
(Gillen 2006). From the Brisbane Airport-Region a range of large infrastructure, residential 
and commercial developments were identified as important to the long-term interests of both 
Brisbane City and Brisbane Airport. Development goals and attributes are included below as 
a case description, with the explicit perspectives of the airport, the city, and the developer 
revealed in from the analysis (see Section 5). 
A brief description of the Brisbane airport-region 
Brisbane Airport serves as a passenger and freight transport hub with international and 
domestic passenger terminals, a cargo terminal and two run-ways. It is the third busiest 
airport in Australia, after Sydney and Melbourne.  Brisbane Airport is operated by the 
Brisbane Airport Corporation (BAC) a consortium led by NV Luchthaven Schipol Group and a 
number of other government and non-government shareholders.  BAC has adopted an 
‘airport city’ development approach that has expanded the focus and orientation of the airport 
beyond that of solely a transport hub to include a wider array of development initiatives both 
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aeronautical and non-aeronautical.  This transformation is well underway with approximately 
320 businesses located within the precinct and the development of a shopping centre and 
office complex. 
 
There has been a history of tension between BAC and Brisbane City Council (BCC) since the 
airport city approach was adopted post-privatisation (see BAC 2010). Airport decisions to 
build commercial developments close to the airport boundary led to a series of press 
releases issued from BCC and a large retail developer, eventually leading to a two year 
Federal Court case between the owner of a nearby shopping mall and BAC. In 2005 the 
Federal Court ruled in favour of BAC. Tensions between the airport and the BCC have eased 
over time; both parties acknowledge that while they may not agree on everything, they have 
a need to ‘get along’. 
 
The airport was initially located some distance from the Brisbane city precinct. Over time, 
however, the distance between the airport and the city has been reduced with urban planning 
strategies including housing and business developments now pressing on the airport 
boundary. The growing reliance on air travel, coupled with the interface between airport and 
the city region has also brought with it increased levels of traffic and congestion, noise 
concerns and other environmental considerations. Airport operation and planning previously 
occurred in a local planning vacuum (Baker and Freestone 2008) and local planning largely 
proceeded without airport input; better integration between the two decision making domains 
is now a dominant concern for sustaining long-term growth strategies (NAPWP 2009). 
 
A number of forums now exist between BAC and BCC for facilitating the transfer of 
information at both operational and strategic organisational levels. These include the BAC-
BCC Protocol and the Brisbane Airport Community Forum for engagement at regular 
intervals; additional consultation between airport and city also occurs through requirements 
set in creating Airport Master Plans, Major Development Plans and Neighbourhood Plans 
(BAC 2009; Airports Act 1996; BCC 2010), and both organisations’ involvement in the 
Australia TradeCoast project (ATC 2008). Additionally, City Master Plans also provide a 
formal avenue for BCC to publicly communicate its strategic intentions. While the 
abovementioned mechanisms for city-airport interaction are in place, a number of 
developments within the Brisbane Airport-Region do not appear to appreciate the strategic 
interests of one, and sometimes all, of the organisations. 
 
Possibly in response to the continuing disconnect of development outcomes and 
regional/local/airport interests, the National Aviation Policy White Paper (2009) has made the 
recommendation for new formal arrangements to improve communication between 
Australian airports and their local/regional stakeholders. Should the White Paper pass into 
legislation unchanged, there is no promise that increasing the number of communication 
pathways between airport-region actors will improve the outcomes of decisions for airport-
region development. The Brisbane case presents itself as an airport-region decision making 
arena with the potential to inform the National Aviation Policy White Paper (2009) from 
existing benefits and/or problems faced by current mechanisms for airport-region integration. 
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4. RESEARCH METHOD 
An exploratory case study approach has been selected to explain and understand how the 
governance of development decision making integration works towards identifying, 
articulating and considering the strategic interests of both airport and city. The case study 
approach is appropriate for answering the two primary research questions (see Section 1) for 
its utility in answering questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin 1994). Documentary analysis and 
semi-structured open ended key informant interviews were selected for providing the rich 
data required to explore the pilot case’s governance arrangement. Interviewing multiple 
respondents from organisations allowed for data triangulation, and added richness and depth 
of content from each decision making organisation. This was considered necessary to 
provide the researchers with confidence in reporting effective and ineffective governance 
arrangements currently used within the pilot case (Denzin 1978; Creswell 2003). 
 
Documentary analysis provided the researcher’s with an understanding of the systems and 
processes in place to facilitate development applications within the Brisbane City and 
Brisbane Airport areas. Documents including news media, formal communiqués and 
consultancy reports were also useful for identifying actors’ espoused issues regarding 
development within the Brisbane Airport-Region. Ten key informant interviews were used to 
identify the different forums used for different types of development issues, and also to 
identify any underlying issues or interests that were not found from searching through 
documentation. 
 
Interviews were transcribed and coded thematically, with emphasis on understanding each 
actors’ perspective of how existing development application arrangements work, what 
interests each actor saw as important for the case, and identifying effective and ineffective 
pathways for facilitating integrative planning for the case development. The coded data was 
analysed for detailing the interests held by each actor versus the interests known by each 
actor, detailing the circumstances leading to why particular governance arrangements were 
used, and for gaining a sense of whether, why and to what extent particular arrangements 
were considered (in)effective for achieving mutually acceptable development outcomes.  
 
The analysis (see Section 5) provided a range of different identified arrangements used for 
identifying, articulating and considering the interests of each airport-region actor. To protect 
the anonymity of the developer and individuals who contributed to the research an 
interpreted ‘perspective’ from each airport-region actor has been provided. The different 
actor perspectives clearly show a number of flaws that exist in current integration 
mechanisms for deciding on development applications in the Brisbane Airport-Region. 
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5. FINDINGS 
Airports and development 
To continue providing regions, in the long run, with access to affordable aviation services and 
to remain as prolific providers of employment within a region, Brisbane Airport requires that a 
number of interests be protected to ensure sustainable airport growth.  These interests 
include (but are not necessarily limited to): 
 
 sufficient land holdings to allow future infrastructure growth 
 enduring access to airspace, particularly landing and take-off flight paths 
 ground access to allow passengers and freight to enter and depart airports on time 
 sufficient revenue streams to develop infrastructure and for shareholder profits 
 
Compromise to any of these interests raises the probability that Brisbane Airport may not be 
able to meet future regional demands for aviation capacity growth, which may in turn either 
hinder the sustainability of regional economic growth, or place pressure on the building of a 
new airport. The National Aviation Policy White Paper (2009, 192) details alternate airport 
development as a very real option for Australian airports by identifying the need of a second 
airport for the Sydney area. As an example of potential impacts the Brisbane Airport should 
the above interests not be protected, Sydney Airport’s capacity is limited by highly regulated 
and monitored curfews and capacity limits to approach and takeoff flight paths as a result of 
residents lobbying against aviation noise. 
 
Curfew status is high on the list of concerns for BAC, and relates directly to the 
abovementioned airport interest of enduring access to airspace. The encroachment of 
residential developments towards airport boundaries and flight paths places pressure, over 
time, on governments to limit noise impacts on residents. From an airport’s perspective the 
approval of residential developments close to its boundary and runway centreline represents 
a future increase of complaints about aircraft noise, which is likely to lead to increased 
pressure on limiting aircraft movements in and out of an airport. When asked about 
governments pursuing residential developments close to airports and underneath flight 
paths, an airport representative was quoted as saying: 
“… an airport represents billions of dollars of investment and ongoing 
value to a region, and to place all of that in jeopardy for the sake of a few 
million in profits right now is just senseless …” 
Curfew status is not the only operations related issue BAC is keen to protect from 
developments close to its boundary. Airports in general require sufficient access for 
passengers and freight to move from the region to the airport and back again. Placing urban 
developments (not just residential) close to an airport boundary has the potential to reduce 
the ability of existing transport corridors to meet the ground accessibility needs of an airport.  
As Kasarda (2001) points out, for an airport to be truly successful it must have supporting 
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regional transport infrastructure that meets the logistics needs of its users. As one airport 
representative noted for a development close to an airport access corridors: 
“… we really don’t mind that kind of development going ahead as long as 
it doesn’t mean a threat to […] the ability of passengers to get to their 
flights on time.” 
For Brisbane Airport, development within the airport-region should include the consideration 
of their strategic interests to ensure the airport can meet the region’s long-term aviation 
demands. Protection of aviation, now and in the future, will help to ensure the operating 
organisation BAC, can stay viable as a business. Currently the airport makes its interests 
known to Brisbane City Council via a range of different forums. BAC considers it needs to 
maintain transparency in its business dealings, particularly as it is a provider of public service 
(access to aviation). Because of this need for transparency BAC typically makes its interests 
formally known to developers through BCC processes. One respondent noted that BAC also 
has access to any number of alternative channels of communication including direct contact, 
press releases, legal avenues, however would only be tempted to use these less transparent 
channels if its interests were under duress. 
 
In terms of BAC influencing decision making for developments outside of the airport 
boundary but within the airport-region, the organisation can extend its influence through a 
number of channels, both formal and informal. Unless a regulation is breached, BAC has no 
legitimate pathway for intervening in the development application process until late in the 
process. When BAC’s interests are threatened, BAC casts its shadow into the airport-region 
via BCC channels as a means of maintaining transparency. However BAC also has its 
discretion in seeking alternative pathways to articulate its interests to developers, such as 
direct contact, press releases, legal channels, and the like. 
Cities and development 
Brisbane City Council (BCC) has a number of key interests for developments in and around 
Brisbane Airport. Foremost BCC is tasked with ensuring the residents of Brisbane are 
provided quality living conditions. In terms of development, the protection of local living 
conditions features heavily in the decision making arrangements for development 
applications. New development projects are encouraged to integrate with the local urban 
environment, for example new developments should fit with the existing style of the area, 
including building heights, design, and green space. 
 
Developments within the planning and approval jurisdiction of BCC can best be managed for 
integration with the local urban environment if managed internally of BCC. This makes sense 
as dialogue between developers and BCC result in building conditions and/or modifications 
to preliminary plans that must be met before approval is gained by the developer. Some 
developments within the airport-region have been (and will continue to be) outside of BCC’s 
planning and approval jurisdiction. For example the State has exercised its discretionary 
powers to take control of ‘underutilised’ land and rezoned and approved development under 
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a created Urban Land Development Authority (ULDA). Additionally, developments on airport 
land are not subject to BCC’s approval as Brisbane Airport falls under the Federal 
Government’s jurisdiction. 
 
Development within the airport-region but not within BCC’s planning and approval jurisdiction 
have often fallen short of what BCC would consider good outcomes, such as tall unit 
buildings in the ULDA North Shore, and a retail outlet at the main entrance to the airport and 
close to a local shopping centre (see 2004 Westfield Limited -v- Brisbane Airport Corporation 
Ltd.). The ability of the State Government to exercise its discretion for taking over 
development approvals power, therefore, provides a key disincentive for BCC to be seen as 
being slow or difficult to developer requests; particularly as there is a strong pro-housing 
State agenda. To lose planning and approval control for a development within any sensitive 
area of the city, including the airport-region, may have significant impacts on the ability of 
BCC to meet its own targets set in the City Plan, and as was noted from one respondent: 
“I think it is a big risk for [the] whole area, you know, an unelected body 
making decisions about development with no appeal rights.” 
While the disconnect between airport and city planning and approval regimes remain, BCC 
has engaged with BAC through a number of channels to foster dialogue and create an 
understanding between the two organisations, and is discussed further below in 
‘Mechanisms for governing development decisions’. Dialogue between the case developer 
and BCC appears more isolated than the ‘regular’ channels that have been created between 
BAC and BCC. 
 
The developer appears well engaged with BCC through a number of simultaneous 
development applications throughout the Brisbane area, and feels its organisation ‘knows 
how to talk’ with BCC, be it through lobbying channels or formal development application 
processes. The developer “knows what [BCC] wants of [the developer’s] development 
applications, and makes sure it meets those expectations”, and likewise BCC recognises that 
they “do business with each other on a regular basis, so [both sides] know the rules of the 
game and what each other is trying to achieve”. However for large scale projects that require 
considerable lobbying outside of formal development application processes, Council has 
identified the potential for development outcomes to depart from Council development 
agendas – where compromises between influential actors result in outcomes that fall short of 
‘optimal’ for all parties involved. 
 
For developments within the airport-region, development applications should meet the 
criteria BCC sets for integrating development with local urban environments. If this is difficult 
to achieve then early and thorough consultation between the developer and BCC is a 
preferred path for ensuring the fundamental interests of the city are appreciated within 
development applications. Developments that place the living conditions/standards of 
existing residents at risk are more likely to attract greater scrutiny within the development 
application process. However, there is a risk that if too great a scrutiny is applied that the 
State Government may exercise its discretionary power to take over the development 
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application process, which past experiences show can have negative impacts on 
coordinating development with existing urban environs (i.e. ULDA North Shore). Additionally, 
processes need to be kept transparent and accountable as a part of the good governance 
practices required of Australian government agencies.  
Developers and development 
Established development companies are politically savvy, and are aware that large scale 
development may become politically sensitive. Large scale developments often require the 
lobbying of local Councillors and decision makers for support before investing in a 
development application process. As noted in discussions with developers and Council 
representatives, developers submitting a large scale development application could surprise 
an influential Member of Parliament, Councillor or Mayor, and risks negative political 
backlash, “particularly if they are caught off guard or are seen as being left out of the 
process”. As such, it is in developers’ interests to become engaged with influential actors that 
have the capacity to influence the decision making process, particularly where they have a 
vested (be it political or direct) interest in development outcomes. 
 
The developer within the pilot case is no different from the above, and has approached a 
range of influential politicians and decision makers to gauge support for or against the 
project. Additionally, the developer has identified the need to coordinate at least some 
aspects of its planning processes with the requirements of BCC, saying: 
“We want to make sure that any public consultation that we do coordinates 
appropriately with Brisbane City Council public consultation, and that it is 
always meaningful.  [...]  It will be done in a coordinated fashion with 
Council’s requirements.” 
Dialogue for the developer has been dominantly focused towards the land owner, creating 
design briefs and concept plans for dual purpose of consulting with the owner, and providing 
a discussion tool for BCC and political interface. The developer identified the physical 
impacts of aviation on building and safety requirements, such as acoustic impacts from 
aircraft that aviation activities attract, and noted its understanding of the airport as an 
objector to development in the local area. However the impacts of the development on 
aviation or airport interests (such as airport access and sustainability) were not readily 
identified. This may be because dialogue between the developer and BAC has not been a 
priority for the developer, as the developer stated: 
“…we are aware that [BAC] is an organisation that at some point we will 
engage with. As to when, we are yet to make up our minds, but we are 
aware of who they are and what they do.” 
So for development within the airport-region, the developer appears aware of the building 
requirements imposed by aviation, and understands that the BAC has a vested interest in 
what happens outside of the airport boundary. However an understanding of the fundamental 
airport interests at stake do not appear well identified. For the developer, their responsibilities 
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lay in meeting the expectations of the land owner and meeting the requirements of the 
agency responsible for assessing development applications. If the airport’s interests are left 
out of those requirements then the developer is likely to see little need to appreciate them, 
which has the potential of attracting more direct attention from BAC in an effort to protect the 
long-term interests of the airport. 
 
In terms of the developer’s influence on the decision making for the pilot case, the developer 
holds the majority of legitimate authority over what to develop, where and when, however 
these factors are guided by existing legislation set by government, particularly building and 
zoning laws. A number of interests between the developer and BCC are complimentary, for 
example, the city needs more housing and office space to facilitate growth, the developer 
proposes to contribute to meeting both of these needs. However the developer also has an 
interest in maximising profits and meeting the needs of the land owner, which may result in a 
development proposal that goes beyond what local residents and stakeholders find 
acceptable. If the developer’s application meets resistance to aspects that are core to 
protecting the interests of the developer and/or the land owner, the developer may seek to 
extend its influence (cast its shadow) via lobbying or legal channels, or alternatively abandon 
the proposed development. 
Mechanisms for governing development decisions 
A suite of mechanisms in place for BAC-BCC dialogue were identified from the documentary 
analysis (as listed in Section 3). Of the identified mechanisms, findings revealed that four 
mechanisms appear dominant for identifying and articulating the interests of the BAC to 
BCC, and to some extent the developer: 
 
 Submissions/formal comments made on development applications 
 Neighbourhood Planning processes 
 The BAC-BCC Protocol 
 Airport Master Planning process 
 
The Airport Master Plan and BAC-BCC Protocol appears most effective at articulating high 
order, strategic interests and concerns of BAC for the airport site and surrounding urban 
environment. Submissions made on development applications within the airport-region, and 
BCC driven Neighbourhood Planning processes appear to be effective for articulating the 
operational requirements of the airport, such as technical information regarding traffic flows, 
rainwater runoff and aviation noise. 
 
The strategic interests of BCC appear best identified and articulated to BAC via the BAC-
BCC Protocol and City Plan 2000, with Neighbourhood Planning processes also providing 
valuable feedback to BAC at the officer level. Information gained at the officer level appears 
well articulated to BAC decision makers via regular internal meetings that feed information 
both horizontally and vertically throughout the organisation. 
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Because the development is still in the early stages of the development application process, 
it is difficult to reveal whether any meaningful consideration of airport or city strategic 
interests has been made by the developer.  While the developer was aware of a many airport 
and city issues, there was little evidence within drafted plans to show due consideration of 
the airport’s interests. This is likely due to the developer’s explicit acknowledgement that 
engagement with the airport was yet to happen, however it appears counterproductive to 
develop plans without comprehensive information of the operating environment. 
 
City interests, insofar as policies and procedures, were well represented by the developer’s 
adherence to design principles established by Council (i.e. green space and fit to local urban 
environment). However a direct challenge to BCC’s perspective of appropriate land use for 
the development site (i.e. zoning restrictions) indicates the developer is expecting to 
negotiate for development approval via a combination of political channels and special 
agreements with BCC. The developer acknowledged that while the plan does not necessarily 
represent all of the interests of the airport or the city, it does represent the interests of the 
land owner and a number of State level interests. As the approving authority for the 
development, BCC may feel encouraged to use its discretion to enforce or change a number 
of development application requirements. This encouragement stems from political and 
airport pressures to meet regional housing targets but protect airspace and accessibility. If 
BCC fails to approve the development, or appears too slow in processing an application the 
State Government may intervene and take over the approval process – this has the potential 
to result in development outcomes that show no consideration of city or airport interests (i.e. 
similar to ULDA projects). 
6. DISCUSSION 
The pilot case is exemplary of a decision making space in which actors each have the 
potential to cast their own institutional shadows. Responding to sub-question one, analysis 
shows that while each actor has the potential to directly influence decision making processes 
via a range of informal and formal fora, they do not always exercise their discretionary 
powers for emphasising their individual positions of interest. At times actors appear 
conciliatory of each others’ positions, however withholding their influence appears to be 
motivated by strategic concerns, such as monitoring each others’ actions, minimising conflict 
or seeking information. The strategic nature of choosing when and how to cast institutional 
shadows, as demonstrated by the actors within the pilot case, corresponds with Scharpf’s 
(1994) conclusions that institutional power is not always exercised; it remains a tool to be 
used strategically for influencing the actions of others.  
 
While the actors in the case appeared highly strategic and adaptive in their chosen 
approaches to the decision making space, there also appeared to be authoritative or 
relational steps in place for moving past tensions. Network governance mechanisms 
between the airport and city, specifically the BAC-BCC Protocol and Neighbourhood 
Planning processes appear to foster mutual understanding of the strategic and operational 
needs of the airport, the city and the developer. BCC’s working knowledge of BAC’s interests 
has provided an informal mechanism, built in at the organisational level for BCC, for 
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informing and tempering preliminary planning by the developer. Airport interests were 
articulated via BCC to the developer throughout preliminary discussions and lobbying 
processes; often at the behest of BAC. This enabled the developer to identify a range of 
potential problems before plans had been decided on for application. However the range of 
airport interests and depth of understanding provided by BCC to the developer did not 
appear comprehensive. The developer’s focus of what aviation means to the development, 
rather than adding consideration to what the development means to the airport is not 
unnatural as planning processes often take an ‘internally centric’ perspective (Alexander 
1998). 
 
With respect to sub-question two, each actor appears to acknowledge that there is a need to 
integrate but each actor tries to ‘solve’ the situation without really exploring each others’ 
interests. By failing to invest appropriate time for identifying and understanding issues, and 
building relationships, network fora that may otherwise help to overcome development issues 
remain underutilised or ineffective. This is underlined by the need for decision making actors 
to have a mutual understanding of the ‘problem’ and of each others’ concerns for network 
decision making structures to work effectively (see Parker 2007). An example of the lack of 
understanding between actors is the uncertainty as to how, when and why the developer 
should engage with Brisbane Airport. Without formal guidelines or informal relationships for 
transferring information between the developer and BAC, greater pressure is applied on the 
developer’s relationships with BCC to provide sufficient information to avoid (or reduce) 
future conflict in the development application process. The actors know integration is a good 
thing, but answering the question of ‘how to do it’ now appears as a primary concern. 
 
Discretion appears to be a key factor for each of the three actors in the study. The developer 
has the discretion to include or not include consideration for BCC and BAC interests in its 
development application, and can also choose to follow due process or manipulate the 
approval system via lobbying, and decisions appear tied to the interests of the land holder 
and the size of the project. BCC has the discretion to either enforce or modify zoning and/or 
development requirements, which appears closely tied to the influence of vertical political 
agendas. BAC has the discretion to choose the channel and level of attention given to the 
consideration of airport interests, which appears closely tied to the predicted impact of the 
development on the long-term sustainability of airport operations. Discretion within the 
decision making frameworks of each actor contributes uncertainty to the outcomes of the 
development application, and has the potential to either create or ease tensions between the 
three primary actors for the development. 
 
While communicating horizontally between the three organisations may enhance the 
identification and articulation of each actors’ strategic interests, discretion provides whether 
(and how) the identified interests are actually considered and acted upon. To relate this back 
to respond to the primary focus of the research and explain how institutional interests and 
arrangements intersect within an airport-region, Figure 2 shows the result of overlapping 
discretionary powers, highlighting a new space where the interests of both city and airport 
are at stake in developments in the airport-region. However, the overlap of interests does not 
mean a mandatory overlap of institutional arrangements. Discretionary enforcement allows 
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for each actor to be strategic in their interactions in the space of overlapping interests, 
particularly where existing arrangements do not clearly describe how developments should 
proceed to appreciate the needs of each actor. Essentially, each actors’ domain has its own 
interests in what happens in the ‘eclipsed’ space, but there are no clear procedures or 
methods in place to ensure each domains’ interests are identified, articulated, and 
considered by all relevant decision makers in that space. 
 
Figure 2. Mandated areas of influence and areas of discretionary influence 
 
The high levels of ambiguity created by insufficient formal governance mechanisms in this 
space, challenges the ability of horizontal (network) structures to cope with ‘filling the 
information gap’ to produce outcomes that sufficiently address the needs of both city and 
airport. We theorise that the crowding of decision making domains, each staking their own 
claims on the same ‘shadowed’ decision making space has equal potential to provide 
productive, innovative outcomes as it does less productive, hostile outcomes between 
decision makers. For example, positive outcomes from overlapping airport, city and 
developer interests can be seen from deliberation within the AirportLink project resulting in 
an additional upgrade to the roundabout at the airport entrance. This outcome is expected 
(still under construction) to deliver improved airport accessibility and reduced traffic 
congestion in the neighbouring urban environment, and improve the attractiveness of the 
AirportLink project to consumers. 
 
The pilot case clearly demonstrates that the airport, city and developer cast intersecting 
shadows from their institutional frameworks. However, discretion at the periphery of decision 
making structures allows for actors to choose whether their overlapping interests compete, 
integrate or appreciate one another. When formal protocols appear unable to articulate 
and/or consider identified interests, respondents point towards horizontal, network 
arrangements to foster more integrative and appreciative stances between actors. However if 
network mechanisms should fail to deliver outcomes that appreciate the fundamental, core 
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interests of one or more actors, respondents point towards formal, hierarchical mechanisms 
to arbitrate decision making processes (such as seeking State intervention in a development 
application, or a court injunction to halt development, etc.). So while network governance 
shows promise for improving the identification, articulation and consideration of airport, city 
and developer interests, network governance can only work so far as discretion does not 
lead to hostility. While this finding appears unsurprising, it is still a concept not well 
addressed in extant literature and deserves greater attention in future. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Both BAC and BCC have, at their individual discretion, the ability to seek the consideration of 
their strategic interests in airport-region developments. Both have avenues available through 
which they can inform and cooperate, engage and coordinate, or ideate and collaborate. The 
Brisbane case of development is not alone in the Australian context, nor the global context. 
Lessons from Appold et al. (2008) show gaps in airport-city integration throughout North 
America, Europe and broader Australasia with no clear solution evident. The presented pilot 
case highlights the disconnect between identifying external interests (such as the city’s and 
airport’s) and having them substantively considered in development processes.  
 
A common theme raised by all actors in the pilot case was the need for more information of 
each others’ intentions and motivations. This suggests that while a number of network 
arrangements exist (or have been created) for facilitating the identification of actors’ 
interests, they are either underutilised or misaligned for transforming interest identification 
and articulation into ‘real’ consideration in developing the Brisbane airport-region. As alluded 
to in Section 1, the reliance on network governance to address complex decision making 
processes is not as sure-footed as previously thought. Decision making actors are unlikely to 
subscribe to the tenets of network governance when their fundamental interests are at stake. 
Instilling horizontal mechanisms between decision making actors may foster the mutual 
identification and understanding of each others concerns, however these mechanisms have 
the potential to be ineffective when institutional shadows overlap so far to include ‘core’ 
interests rather than just ‘discretionary’ interests. 
 
The pilot study provides a (somewhat rare) empirical case of a contested decision making 
space, where the actors’ interests overlap with the potential for conflict between 
organisations via the perspectives each actor brings to the decision making space. Each 
actor has the power to cast a shadow into the decision making processes for the 
development case, however the actors involved cast their shadows strategically, and only 
‘flex’ their powers when potential outcomes impinge on core interests. Although the actors 
recognise the need to integrate (to some extent) to reduce the potential for conflict, what 
appears to be limiting them is their attention to the own agendas and interests rather than 
seeing the development as a joint problem. That is, the actors see the potential benefits of 
integrating, however fail to realise opportunities of integration as they remain independent 
rather than interdependent. Until the actors make the leap to approach development as a 
shared problem, they will likely remain focused towards following hierarchical decision 
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making processes rather than investing in more horizontal, network mechanisms of 
integration. 
 
The mixing of governance modes to create hybrid arrangements is both common and 
natural, and is no different for the presented case of development (Black 2008; Keast et al. 
2006). Network and hierarchical mechanisms are both evident within the pilot case, however 
particular mechanisms appear dominant over others based on the strategic motivations of 
individual actors. The inability of network mechanisms to overcome the shortfalls of existing 
hierarchical arrangements means that the developer is likely to continue down the planning 
path with incomplete information of the airport’s interests, which fails to reduce potential 
conflict between actors. The underutilisation of network mechanisms in the pilot case is 
congruent to recent findings from Nyseth, who found that “networks operating in an 
institutional vacuum tend to fail in institutional capacity building” (2008, 497).  
Limitations 
Limitations of the pilot case stem from both contextual and methodological issues. The pilot 
case is located in a region experiencing growth above the national average, so there may be 
supernormal pressures placed on actors to perform, thus influencing the extent to which they 
protect their strategic interests. This could limit the extent to which actors exercised their 
discretion in protecting their individual interests, thus limiting the ability of network 
governance to perform, however this would only reinforce the thesis of our argument. If 
tensions were reduced for the actors we would expect existing horizontal mechanisms to 
provide more effective communication amongst the actors. 
 
The pilot study’s timeline, in terms of being an incomplete development, is a limiting factor to 
the findings and discussions provided above. No final outcome of development can be 
defined, so our findings may be limited to studying the integration of decision making during 
preliminary planning and approval processes; ongoing investigation of the development case 
will help to define this limitation further. Additionally, as an initial (pilot) study, the external 
validity of findings across types of development and to other airport regions is limited, and 
should be addressed via replicated studies across contexts. 
 
Interviews were conducted with key informants from both senior and middle management 
levels of the actor organisations; however data may be biased towards BAC and BCC 
perspectives due to a skew in the number of respondents from each organisation. While 
triangulation of data sources (documentary evidence) has been used to counteract this bias, 
the possibility of skewed data can not be ignored. Further interviews and replication of the 
study is underway to build on the existing data set and create new data to compare findings. 
 
Finally, differences in legislation and government should be considered when considering the 
pilot case. Australia’s airports are highly privatised (long-term lease agreements), an attribute 
that is common to airports globally. The extent to which an airport is privatised, and the 
arrangements underpinning decision making authority (particularly for planning development 
and building long-term strategies) are likely to have considerable impacts on the way airport 
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and government actors approach issues of airport-region development. This makes the 
findings of the paper more appropriate for highly privatised airports that are responsible for 
their own strategy and development decisions. 
Future research 
Future research should focus on in-depth analysis of the limitations of different governance 
modes in competitive, crowded domains of decision making to improve academic and 
practical understandings of governance. The authors intend for the pilot study to pave the 
way for replicated studies for determining the effectiveness of network type arrangements 
across a range of development types and jurisdictions within the airport-region context. By 
comparing development cases from a range of settings and positions of interest the authors 
intend to develop a model of best practice for the governance of development decisions in 
airport-regions.  
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